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Abstract—Administrating and monitoring New Technology
File System (NTFS) permissions can be a cumbersome and
convoluted task. In today’s data rich world there has never
been a more important time to ensure that data is secured
against unwanted access. This paper identifies the essential and
fundamental requirements of access control, highlighting the
main causes of their misconfiguration within the NTFS. In
response, a number of features are identified and an efficient,
informative and intuitive software-based solution is proposed for
examining file system permissions. In the first year that the
software has been made freely available it has been downloaded
and installed by over four thousand users1.
I. INTRODUCTION
Controlling access permissions to a given file system is
an important aspect of data security. Having a secure and
flexible way of viewing and managing access control should be
a standard requirement of all modern file systems. This should
certainly be true of the New Technology File System (NTFS),
since NTFS is currently the most common file system in use.
This is mainly due to Microsoft’s dominance of computing
operating systems. Surprisingly, however, no such flexibility
exists for the NTFS and the process for determining access
controls is cumbersome at best.
The NTFS implements access control with the use of
Access Control Lists (ACLs). Each file system object (folder
or file) will have an associated ACL for controlling access.
An ACL contains a list of ACEs (Access Control Entities).
Each ACE contains information regarding the interacting user
or group, and the level of access that they will be granted.
It is well reported that from observing an ACE that the
following information can be established [1]–[3]:
1) The user or group that the ACE applies to.
2) The level of granted permission for a user or group.
3) Information regarding the prorogation of the permis-
sion down the directory hierarchy
The way in which users are required to interact with ACEs
and ACLs in the NTFS results in the following peculiarities:
1) Permissions are interacted with on a per object level,
rather than per user [4]. This does not allow for the
1Available at: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk9743
and http://download.cnet.comNTFSPermissionsExplorerSnapIn30002094 4-
75325639
administrator to evaluate user permission across a
whole directory structure.
2) Interacting with a single ACL using Windows Ex-
plorer as seen in Figure 1 requires the traversal of
four different interfaces. Interacting with multiple
ACLs soon becomes a cumbersome task, which could
ultimately result in permissions being overlooked.
3) Not only is the administrator required to examine
users or groups within the ACL, they have to re-
member, or explore, group association to evaluate the
inheritance of permissions from different groups.
It is well reported that these time-consuming peculiarities re-
sult in the potential for errors to occur, which could ultimately
result in users being denied access, or in the worst case, the
possibility for unwanted access to occur [3]–[7].
Previous efforts to provide a solution to the identified
problems [4] have been mostly successful, however, since their
production the NTFS has evolved to allow for the specification
of fine- and -coarse grained file system permissions [8]. This
brings additional complexity as not only can the standard
six permission levels be granted, there is the possibility to
create ‘special permissions’ which are constructed from any
combination of the possible fourteen permission attributes.
Microsoft provide a variety of command line utilities [9]–
[11] and third-party solutions are also available [12] to examine
permission allocation. However, the shortcomings of these
utilities make none of them serve as a single solution. These
shortcomings can be summarised as the inabilities to:
1) Show both fine- and coarse-grained permissions.
2) Examine permissions on multiple folders at once.
3) Evaluate permissions per user rather than per object.
There is insufficient literature available to suggest that
freely available tools have been developed to significantly aid
with the administration and reporting of NTFS permissions
[1]–[3], as well as providing detailed information regarding
the low-level implementation NTFS access control [13]. There
are few research papers aimed at understanding NTFS access
control [14], [15] and how it can be improved through better
administration [8]. One author has provided a formal model of
NTFS access control, describing fundamentals of rigours im-
plementation [16], but there is no indication of the production
of any tools that make this available for system administrators.
One paper provides the results for an alternative manage-
ment interface for NTFS permissions [7]. Through careful con-
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Fig. 1. Analysing NTFS file system permissions using Windows Explorer
sideration to human and computer interaction, an application
was designed where they could performed administration tasks
significantly faster, whilst reducing potential errors. However,
the work is restricted to only viewing file system permissions
for a single directory at any one time. Since the work was been
published, there is no evidence that the tool has been made
available in the public domain. Other work includes using
novel ways to represent security policies [17]. This work is
also concerned with temporal aspects of managing file system
permissions, whereas the work in this paper is also concerned
with providing useful features to aid the quality of the analysis
and help to reduce misconfiguration.
This paper starts by giving a detailed description of how
NTFS implements file system permissions, highlighting com-
plexities that result in misconfiguration. A design is then
provided, detailing how a software tool can be used to help
overcome the complexities, reducing misconfiguration. The
next section discusses the functionality of the produced piece
of software. This section describes how the functionality can
be used to overcome the highlighted complexities by using
real-world examples where possible. Finally, we conclude by
discussing the beneficial impacts that the solution can bring,
and suggest future developments.
II. NTFS ACCESS CONTROL
In this section we describe the inner-workings of the
NTFS as regards to permission management. It is necessary
to investigate the following aspects to motivate the designed
solution.
A. Access control structure
The NTFS follows in the footsteps of Microsoft’s object-
oriented approach to implementation. This means that the file
system is made up of multiple file and folder objects, and
any subject within the operating system (user or process) can
request operations on the objects.
To control access to file system objects, the NTFS imple-
ments Access Control Lists (ACLs) by applying an ACL to
each object within the file system. Each ACL will contain a
Security Identifier (SID) which is a unique key that identifies
Fig. 2. Access Control List illustration
TABLE I. BIT MASK
Bit / Bit range Description Example
0-15 Object specific access rights Read Data, Execute, Append Data
16-22 Standard security access rights Delete ACE, Write ACL, Write owner
23 Access to ACL Access System Security
24-27 Reserved n/a
28 Generic all 29 ∪ 30 ∪ 21
29 Generic Execute All needed to execute
30 Generic Write All needed to write to a file
31 Generic Read All needed to read a file
the owner of the object and the primary associated group.
The structure of the ACL is a sequential storage mechanism
which contains access control entries (ACEs). An ACE is an
element within an ACL which dictates the level of access
given to the interacting subject. The ACE contains a SID
that identifies the particular subject, an access mask which
contains information regarding the level of permissions and
the inheritance flags. Figure 2 illustrates the logical structure
of an ACL and associated ACEs.
B. Access Mask
An ACE within the NTFS is made up of a combination of
fourteen individual permission attributes. The NTFS provides
six levels of standard coarse-grained permission that consist
of a combination of predefined attributes. It is also the case
that NTFS allows for the creation of special coarse-grained
permissions which consist of any combination of the fourteen
individual attributes [3].
The access mask is represented by a thirty-two-bit vector.
Table I identifies the use of each bit within the vector. It
is evident from the table that the standard coarse-grained
permissions are represented as follows;
Fine-grained special permissions are represented by using
the bits within the range of zero to fifteen. Creating a special
permission for most is a very useful feature; however, it can
often be a source of confusion as it requires the complete
understanding of the authority that each attribute holds [18].
A good example of having to use special permissions is
when you wish to assign a group of users the standard privilege
elevation of modify for all the contents of a shared folder.
TABLE II. STANDARD COARSE GRAINED PERMISSION BITS
Coarse-grained level Set bit(s)
Read bit31
Write bit30
List folder contents bit31 ∪ bit29
Read and execute bit31 ∪ bit29
Modify bit31 ∪ bit29 ∪ bit30
Full control bit28
TABLE III. PROPAGATION AND INHERITANCE
Bit Name Use
1 container inherit ace Applies the ACE to all the children objects
2 no propagate inherit ace Propagates the ACE to the child object without bit
1 being set, therefore, stopping propagation at the
first level.
3 inherit only ace The ACE only applies to children objects. (i.e.
does not apply to container)
However, creating an ACE with the modify permission on the
folder explicitly will result in the user being able to delete
the folder itself rather than the child objects (Table I). To get
around this problem we would simply assign the group or user
the default permission level of Modify, and then go and modify
the permissions’ attributes turning it into a special permission
so that only subfolders and files can be deleted.
C. Propagation and Inheritance
It is necessary to discuss the different mechanisms behind
the way that NTFS permissions can propagate throughout
the directory structure. Within the ACL there are two types
of ACE; (1) Explicit and (2) Inherited. Explicit entries are
those that are applied directly to the objects’ ACL, whereas
inherited are those that are propagated from their parent object.
The type of ACE allows to determine whether the permission
was assigned directly to the directory in question (explicit)
or if it was inherited from the directory that it resides within
(inherited).
This mechanism is controlled by the bit-flag within each
ACE as seen in Figure 2. Table III shows the standard three
coarse-grained levels of propagation and explains their use.
Furthermore, the creation of fine-grained special file system
permissions also allows for the creation of custom fine-grained
inheritance rules. Special inherited permissions can be different
depending on whether the ACE has the container inherit ace
bit flag set which controls whether the ACE is applied to
all the children objects or not. The creation of fine- grained
propagation rules can easily be overlooked and can ultimately
result in the unintended propagation of access.
One of the main difficulties with access propagation with
the NTFS is correctly evaluating the effective propagation
rules. For a user to view the propagation rules the same situa-
tion as viewing the effective permission applies, where the user
is required to traverse through the several Windows interface
to retrieve the required information as seen in Figure 4.
D. Accumulation
Accumulation is the possibility for the subject to receive
the effective permission of multiple different policies. This fea-
Fig. 3. Explicit beford inherited demonstration
ture is prominent within the NTFS resulting in the possibility
for a subject to receive permissions from multiple different
ACEs within the same ACL. Furthermore, any subject that
interacts with the NTFS can be assigned to any number of
groups, which can be entered into the ACE. This means that
the user does not have to be directly entered into the ACE,
they could simply be a member of the group that is entered.
The policy combination is handled within the operating
system by the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service
(LSASS). This service combines the permissions together to
effectively create the union of all the policies. There are
few complexities within permission accumulation due to the
structured way in which ACEs are processed. These are:
1) Explicit permissions take precedence over inherited
permissions.
2) Explicit deny permissions always take precedence
over apply permissions.
3) Permissions inherited from closer relatives take
precedence over relatives. further away.
It might expect that deny permissions always take prece-
dence over apply permissions to ensure that during the policy
combination stage the user always operates as the least possible
privilege elevation. However, the first point regarding explicit
permissions taking precedence over inherited permissions can
result in a situation where an inherited deny permission is never
reached. Considering the folder structure in Figure 3, where
the folder Accounting has an explicit deny permission for the
Everyone group, which is set to propagate to all its children.
This means that all the subfolders to the Accounting folder
will receive an inherited deny Everyone ACE. If the case was
to arise, like in this example, where a single user now requires
access to the Plan folder, an explicit ACE to allow access
could be entered. Now when the user visits the Plan folder,
the LSASS would process the explicit allow permission first
and allow for it to take precedence over any other permission.
This goes against a fundamental aspect of policy combination
to ensure that a deny permission is never ignored. If the case
where a user is able to ignore a deny permission to receive
access was to either intentionally or unintentionally arise, the
system administrator needs to be made aware of this situation.
To summarise, the precedence hierarchy for policy accu-
mulation is as follows:
1) Explicit deny.
2) Explicit allow.
3) Inherited deny.
4) Inherited allow.
In addition to the explicit permissions taking precedence
over inherited permissions, inherited permissions that of closer
distance to the invoked object will take precedence over more
distant relatives. For example, a folder’s inherited permissions
will take precedence over those from their grandparent.
Accounting for permission accumulation has currently been
made possible by using the standard Windows Explorer feature
of displaying the effective permission. This feature allows for
the user to enter a specified user or group and the effective
permission that they hold on that specific directory will be
displayed. Unfortunately, performing this evaluation on several
folders soon becomes infeasible.
E. Group Membership
A fundamental aspect of access control within the NTFS is
that of group membership. A subject (group, user or process)
that interacts with the file system can be a member of any
group. This means that permissions can be inherited from
any of the associated groups if they are entered within any
ACL. Subjects, in this case users, will often be grouped
together by (separation of duty) to make management easier,
and as Hanner, 1999 [4] identifies, understanding effective file
permissions can become significantly more complex by group
association. To correctly evaluate a user’s effective permissions
you would have to know which groups they are a member
of. We should note that this is not directly related to the
mechanism of how NTFS implements access control, it is an
unavoidable component of how Microsoft allows for users,
groups and processes to be managed by group association.
III. NOVEL SOLUTION
This section describes the design of a solution based on
the NTFS’s inner-workings which can cause the identified
administrative complexities as seen in Section II.
A. Coarse- and Fine-Grained Permissions
As previously described, the NTFS allows for the standard
set of coarse permissions, but also allows for the creation of
special fine-grained permissions.
An alternative method of display, special permissions could
be displayed by a character-to-attribute representation. This
way a string can be constructed to display the full granularity
of the permission by only using little space. For example, if
a special permission was constructed to have the attributes
enabled:
1) Read (R).
2) Write (W).
3) Delete subfolders and files (Dc).
4) Read permissions (Rp).
5) Change permissions (Cp).
Using the character-to-attribute would results in the pro-
duction of the string ‘R-W-Dc-Rp-Cp’. After some time the
user would become accustom to this relationship and the key
would no longer be required.
B. Multiple Folders
Algorithm 1: Depth-first recursive directory search,
analysing and filtering security permissions.
Input: Initial directory d
Input: Set of ACEs to be filtered out
F = (f1, f2, f3, . . . , fn)
Output: Set of ordered directories and ACEs
P = (d1, (p1, p2, p3, . . . , pn)) where dn is the
directory and pn are the permission entries for
that directory.
1 Algorithm algo()
3 P ← proc(d)
5 return
6
1 Procedure proc(directory d)
2 pACL← d(ACL)
3 foreach subdirectory c of d do
4 cACL← c(ACL)
5 if cACL ! = pACL then
6 foreach ACE a in cACL do
7 if a 6∈ F then
8 if isSpecial(a) then
9 p← compress(p)
10 else
11 p← a
12 end
13 P ← (c, p)
14 proc(c)
15 end
16
17 end
18
It has previously been identified that Windows Explorer
allows for the examination of an objects’ ACL, however, it
is often the case that evaluating multiple ACLs is necessary.
A useful way to view multiple ACLs would be to allow the
examination of a whole directory structure simultaneously.
This would provide the means to also examine how the prop-
agation and inheritance aspects of the ACLs are interacting.
Algorithm 1 describes the recursive depth-first examination
search technique that has been implemented for analysing the
permissions of multiple folders. This algorithm traverses the
directory structure, analysing each directories permissions. In
each analysis, the algorithm evaluates whether:
1) It is necessary to display the current ACL to the user
based on whether it is different from the parent’s
ACL.
2) Each ACE in the ACL contains a special permission.
3) Report the ACE to the user, displaying the level of
permission.
C. Compression
As seen on line 9 of Algorithm 1, a compress function is
called if a special permission is identified. This compress func-
tion performs the character-to-attribute mapping as described
in Section III-A. In this method, an enumerated type is used for
changing the permission attributes to the associated character.
D. Filtering
Filtering of groups is easily performed as shown on line
7 of Algorithm 1 where a check is made to ensure that the
current ACE a is not present in the set of groups to filer F .
This provides the facility to filter for multiple user or group
objects, therefore removing excess information.
E. Per User View
When performing a per user search of the file system,
Algorithm 1 is used, however, line 7 is substituted with a
condition to check that the ACE in question is the one that
is being searched for (a ∈ F ). This means that all groups and
user objects are excluded if they are not represent in the filter
list. When viewing per user, the filer list contains the user or
group that the user wants to analyse.
F. Accumulation
Algorithm 1 identifies provides a search strategy that can
report the file system permissions for an entire directory
structure, whilst considering compression and filtering. Al-
though the returned permission information is what is visible
in the ACE, it might not be the user’s effective permission
as no consideration to permission accumulation as described
in Section II-D is taken. Algorithm 2 provides an alterna-
tive method where the search concentrates on calculating
the effective permission that the user and or group hold.
Algorithm 2 shows an algorithm that can be used to store
the explicit ex and inherited in permissions based on the
inheritance and propagation. This algorithm considers both
the inheritance and deny hierarchies. For speed purposes the
algorithm can identify deny permissions and stop the algorithm
from continuing the examine the ACL. Line 16 shows that once
the explicit and inherited permissions have been identified a
function is then called to calculate the effective permission.
In this algorithm calculatedEffective(explicit, inherited)
represents a native Microsoft .NET command that is able
to return the effective permission. Using this native method
ensures that the correct effective permission is reported.
G. Group Membership
User and group membership is fundamental mechanism
that allows users to inherit file system permissions from group
objects. A simple recursive method can be used to examine a
user or groups membership. There are two possible directions
in which the group membership can be analysed. The first is to
examine which groups an object is a member of. This is where
a search is performed to recursively report which groups a user
or group is a member of. The second method is the members of
displaying a user or groups members. This is where a recursive
search is performed to reporting on a groups members.
IV. DEVELOPED SOLUTION
The developed software-based tool is programmed in C#
.NET 3.5 with the use of the Microsoft Management Console
(MMC) System Development Kit (SDK) to produce a MMC
SnapIn application. The motivation behind making the appli-
cation run in the MMC was to bring consistency with other
Microsoft management tool, therefore, making the software
self-intuitive for the users.
Algorithm 2: Depth-first recursive directory search, re-
turning the effective permission of a specified user or
group.
Input: Initial directory d
Input: Initial group or user u
Output: Set of ordered directories and ACEs
P = (d1, (p1, p2, p3, . . . , pn)) where dn is the
directory and pn are the permission entries for
that directory.
1 Algorithm algo()
3 P ← proc(d)
5 return
6
1 Procedure proc(directory d)
2 pACL← d(ACL)
3 foreach subdirectory c of d do
4 cACL← c(ACL)
5 if cACL ! = pACL then
6 ex = ∅, in = ∅
7 foreach ACE a in cACL do
8 if isExplicitDeny(a) then
9 P ← (c, a)
10 break
11 else
12 else if isExplicitAllow(a) then
13 ex← a
14 else if isInherited(a) then
15 in← a
16 P ← (c, calculatedEffective(ex, in))
17 end
18
19 end
20
The software runs under the credentials of the executing
user, therefore, only receiving access to view file system
permissions that they have been assigned to. The software runs
in real-time, processing the desired ACLs upon request. This
means that the software requires only a minimal amount of
installation, and does not require an additional database to store
permission entries. The overheads caused by the application on
both the host machine and any interacting file servers are very
small and do not affect normal performance at all.
In this remaining of this section, the provided functionality
is discussed, using examples where possible.
A. Application Layout
As seen in Figure 4, the interface has three main sections.
Firstly on the left is the control pane. The control pane is where
the user can see all the physical and remote mounted NTFS
volumes. The user is able to browse the folder structure of all
local and remote drives in a Windows standard hierarchical
tree view. In addition, any effective permission searches that
the user performs will be listed here. The middle pane is
where the associated results from the item selected within the
control pane are displayed. On the right is the action pane. This
pane contains functionality associated with each of the items
selected within the control pane that can affect the contents of
the results pane.
Fig. 4. Developed MMC Application
The results pane shows the ACL for the specified local or
remote drive, providing that the executing user has permission
to view the ACL. This pane contains the same ACL informa-
tion as present in the Windows Explorer interface. The ACEs
are classified into the standard NTFS sets although List Folders
is not classed as a set because the permission is the same as
Read & Execute, just the propagation is different, which is
correctly displayed.
B. Coarse- and Fine-Grained Permissions
As described in the design, the application does have a
different way of representing special permissions. To allow the
user to easily and correctly see the fine-grained permissions
the special permissions are displayed as a hyphen separated
character string, where each character is associated with a
different special permission attribute.
As shown in Figure 5 the group ‘BUILTIN\Users’ has a
special permission entry that is displayed by the hyphenated
character string. On further inspection of this permission it is
possible to view the character-to-attribute relationship, which
is also displayed in Figure 5. After using the application we
might start to remember the character-to-attribute relationship,
meaning that we do not need to inspect the special permission,
therefore, further speeding up the process of reporting fine-
grained special permissions. The results pane also shows
information regarding whether each permission (ACE) is an
allow or deny permission, and also the propagation level of
each of the ACE entries.
C. Traversal View and Custom Filter
Another highlighted problem was difficulties within trying
to view the ACL for multiple folders at any one time. The
developed application avoids this issue by firstly allowing a
user to simply traverse the file system in the control pane to
view the ACL for a single folder, and secondly, allowing the
user to view the ACLs for a whole directory in one traversal
view. To reduce the quantity of displayed information and help
display what is useful to the user, by default the traversal view
will only show the ACL for a folder that is not the same as
its parents’. A custom filter has also been implemented so that
the user can select groups and users that they do not wish to
include in the traversal view.
Fig. 5. Developed MMC Application
Fig. 6. Traversal view with custom filter
Figure 6 shows the results pane when the traversal function
is applied to the local folder C:\Users. The illustration also
shows the filter interface where the user can select groups
that they wish to remove from view. The traversal view also
displays both fine- and coarse-grained permissions in the same
way as the individual view where the permissions are classified
as the standard or special sets.
D. Permission Accumulation
Policy combination can be one of the most time consuming
aspects of the NTFS when trying to evaluate the permission
that a subject holds on any given location. As described earlier,
accumulation of deny and access permissions, group member-
ship as well as consideration to the ACE processing hierarchy
results in several complication factors to the evaluation. The
developed application has a built-in search feature to show the
exact effective permissions for a given subject on the selected
location. Figure 7 shows the interface after performing a
custom search for the user ‘simon-PC\simon’ on the directory
‘C:\User’. The same logic applies when performing a search
where only permissions that differ from their parent object are
displayed by default, and special permissions are displayed
using the hyphenated character representation.
Fig. 7. Permissions accumulation search results
V. CONCLUSIONS
We began by examining in detail the workings of access
control within the NTFS to highlight the potential causes of
complexity, which could ultimately lead to unintended access.
Next, we discussed the common usability problems that can
be experienced when examining NTFS permissions. Following
this, we developed a Microsoft Management Console SnapIn
application to provide a new way of examining NTFS permis-
sions that can help overcome the identified complexities. We
believe that our study and software solution helps to improve
file system security by providing an intuitive, efficient and
thorough method for permission examination.
This paper provides a contribution to system administrators
by aiding them with permission examination and allocation.
The requirement to provide a software-based tool to overcome
the identified complexities can be established from the in
excess of four thousand downloads the tool has received
since production. This shows that NTFS administrators are
actively seeking support for their duties. In addition to the
number of downloads, the tool has also received promotion
through a rated software site [19] and a useful list of system
administration tools [20]. This emphasises how requirement
for such tool.
VI. FUTURE SCOPE
Future work involves allowing for the user to modify
file system permissions once a problem has been identified.
Another possibility is a software tool that can automatically
identify configuration problems and suggest intelligent solu-
tions.
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